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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
PAUL EDWIN WOOLLEY, : Case No. 900012-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a 
first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in denying 
Appellants challenge of a juror for cause? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for two 
counts of Forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-501 (1953 as amended). A jury found Mr. Woolley guilty 
of both counts after a trial held on October 31 and November 1, 1989 
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 28, 1989, at about 1:30 p.m., Steven Blaylock 
placed his checkbook in the center console of his Ford Bronco truck 
(TI 78). (Volume I of the transcript is cited herein as TI, 
Volume II is cited as T2.) At about 4:30 p.m. on that same day, he 
noticed that the checkbook was gone and called his bank to stop 
payment on the missing checks (TI 80). The missing checks were 
numbered 710 through 725 (TI 78). 
At about 6:00 p.m. on August 28, 1989, Peggy Kobashigawa, a 
clerk at the courtesy booth of the Smith's Food King located at 828 
South 9 00 West in Salt Lake City, cashed a check in the amount of 
fifty dollars for Appellant (TI 57). The check was made out to 
Appellant and Appellant showed Ms. Kobashigawa his Smith's check 
cashing card and his Utah identification card in order to cash the 
check (TI 59-60). The check was drawn on the account of Steven 
Blaylock and numbered 713 (TI 57, 58). 
Ms. Kobashigawa testified that two or three hours before 
Mr. Woolley cashed the fifty dollar check, he had approached her and 
attempted to cash a check made out to him for one hundred dollars. 
She told Mr. Woolley that she could not cash a two-party check for 
more than fifty dollars (TI 57). 
About an hour or two after Ms. Kobashigawa cashed the fifty 
dollar check, Mr. Woolley returned to the store and attempted to 
cash another fifty dollar check. Ms. Kobashigawa refused to cash 
the check, t€illing Appellant that she would cash only one fifty 
dollar check for an individual in a twenty-four-hour period (TI 63). 
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On the morning of August 29, 1989, Mr. Woolley asked Carol 
Goode, a checker in the same Smith's Food King, to cash the second 
fifty dollar check for him (TI 95). Mr. Woolley again presented his 
Smith's card and Utah identification card (TI 95-6). Because the 
ZIP code on the check was outside the store's area, Ms. Goode called 
for a manager to approve the check (TI 96). 
Officers called to the store arrested Mr. Woolley shortly 
thereafter. According to one of the arresting officers, Mr. Woolley 
stated that he had received the checks from Steven Blaylock in 
exchange for work he had done for Mr. Blaylock (TI 107). 
Mr. Woolley also told officers that he had cashed a check at the 
store the night before (TI 108). 
The arresting officers contacted Mr. Blaylock, who 
immediately went to the Smith's store (TI 108). Mr. Blaylock 
indicated that he had not written the checks to Mr. Woolley; 
Mr. Woolley told the officers that the person representing himself 
to be Steven Blaylock who had written the checks was not the man who 
appeared at Smith's (TI 111). 
Mr. Woolley had regularly frequented the Smith's where the 
checks were cashed for at least eighteen months (TI 145-6). The 
checks were made out to him and he used his identification in 
cashing them (TI 59, 95). He testified that he had been hired at 
the Utah State Employment Office by a man claiming to be Steven 
Blaylock to do two days of labor in Heber City. The man paid him 
with the one hundred dollar check, but when Mr. Woolley was unable 
to cash the check, the man wrote him two fifty dollar checks instead 
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(TI 152-3, 155, 156-7). 
The State charged Mr, Woolley with two counts of Forgery, 
During voir dire, the trial judge asked the jury panel 
whether any of the jurors had "been the victim of a forgery or a 
crime involving deception or fraud" (TI 32). Jurors Hoyt, 
VanLeeuwen and Tyler answered that they had been victims of such a 
crime (TI 33)• Mr. Hoyt stated that his wallet was taken while he 
was in California and his credit card had been used (TI 33). 
Mr, VanLeeuwen stated that he "was in Brazil at the time that they 
stole checks and wrote about five grand on [his] account" (TI 33). 
Mr, Tyler stated that some checks were stolen from him in 1961 when 
he lived in Los Angeles and someone had forged his signature on some 
of those checks (TI 33). (See Addendum B for transcript of entire 
voir dire covering this issue.) 
Rather than asking the three jurors what their reactions 
were to the forgeries, the trial judge asked whether the prior 
experience would preclude them from deciding the instant case based 
only on the evidence before them (TI 33). None of the three 
indicated that the prior experience would interfere (TI 33). 
At the conclusion of voir dire, during a bench conference, 
defense counsel challenged all three jurors (TI 35, 74-5). The 
trial judge initially struck all three jurors for cause, then 
reinstated Juror VanLeeuwen (R 46; TI 74-5). The court's rationale 
for reinstating Mr. VanLeeuwen was that because "Mr. VanLeeuwen's 
experience did occur in a foreign country, that the objection to 
striking at least Mr. VanLeeuwen from that group for cause was well 
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taken . . . " (TI 76) . 
The jury convicted Mr. Woolley of both counts (R 74, 75). 
The trial court sentenced Mr. Woolley to serve zero to five years at 
the Utah State Prison on each count, such sentences to be served 
concurrently. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to excuse 
for cause a juror who had been a victim of a crime identical to the 
crime with which Appellant was charged. The similarity of the 
crimes raised an inference of bias which required that the trial 
judge excuse the juror or probe further. The fact that the trial 
judge excused two other jurors who gave similar answers to that of 
the challenged juror, and initially excused the challenged juror, 
then changed his mind, demonstrates the error in retaining the 
juror. Because Appellant was required to use a peremptory challenge 
against the juror who should have been excused for cause, Appellant 
is entitled to a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
EXCUSE FOR CAUSE A JUROR WHO HAD BEEN THE VICTIM OF 
AN IDENTICAL CRIME. 
Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in 
pertinent part: 
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(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to 
a particular juror and may be taken on one or more 
of the following grounds: 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the 
part of the juror with reference to the cause, 
or to either party, which will prevent him from 
acting impartially and without prejudice to the 
substantial rights of the party challenging; 
but no person shall be disqualified as a juror 
by reason of having formed or expressed an 
opinion upon the matter or cause to be 
submitted to such jury, founded upon public 
rumor, statements in public journals or common 
notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the 
court that the juror can and will, 
notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially 
and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to 
him. 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantee an accused 
in a criminal proceeding the right to a trial by an impartial 
jury.1 In an effort to comply with this constitutional provision, 
the legislature enacted Utah Code Ann, § 77-35-18 (1982).2 State v. 
Brooks. 563 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1977) ("Brooks I"). 
1
 The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of an impartial jury in a criminal proceeding and has 
reversed criminal convictions based solely on the appearance that 
such right may have been jeopardized. See State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 
277, 279-81 (Utah 1988) (discussing rationale for presumption of 
prejudice where improper contact between jurors and witnesses or 
court personnel occurs); see also State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 
1989) (appellant entitled to new trial where prosecutor struck 
Hispanic juror to get even with defense counsel who had insisted 
that Hispanics be included on panel). 
2
 The Utah Supreme Court adopted the rule as Rule 18, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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It is well established that a party is entitled to use his 
or her peremptory challenges on impartial jurors. Brooks I, 563 
P.2d at 802-3; Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975); 
State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 883 (Utah 1981) ("Brooks II"). 
Prejudicial error occurs where a party is required to use a 
peremptory challenge to exclude a juror who should have been excused 
for cause. Crawford at 1093; State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 
(Utah 1980); Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 537 (Utah 1981); 
State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1987). The rationale for 
finding reversible error in any case where a defendant is forced to 
use a peremptory challenge to exclude a juror who should have been 
excused for cause is: 
Peremptory challenges form an effective method of 
assuring the fairness of a jury trial. Hence, 
forcing a party to use his peremptory challenges to 
strike jurors who should have been stricken for 
cause denies the litigant a substantial right. 
Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 537, quoting Waskel v. Frankel, 569 P.2d 230, 
232 (Ariz. 1977). In State v. Bailey, the Utah Supreme Court 
pointed out that: 
[F]ailure to excuse the challenged juror for cause 
was prejudicial and in effect it deprived defendant 
of one of his statutory peremptory challenges . . . . 
Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768, quoting State v. Moore, 562 P.2d 629, 631 
(Utah 1977). 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined juror impartiality as a 
"mental attitude of appropriate indifference." Brooks I, 563 P.2d 
at 802. As the Utah Supreme Court noted: 
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Chief Justice Marshall, presiding over the trial of 
Aaron Burr in 1807, defined an impartial jury as one 
composed of persons who "will fairly hear the 
testimony which may be offered to them, and bring in 
their verdict, according to that testimony, and 
according to the law arising on it," 
State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d at 767, quoting Burr's Trial, p. 415. The 
Bailey court further quoted Marshall's test for impartiality which 
the United States Supreme Court embraced in Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878): 
[L]ight impressions which may fairly be supposed to 
yield to the testimony that may be offered; which may 
leave the mind open to a fair consideration of that 
testimony, constitute no sufficient objection to a 
juror; but that those strong and deep impressions 
which will close the mind against the testimony that 
may be offered in opposition to them; which will 
combat that testimony and resist its force, do 
constitute a sufficient objection to him (citation 
omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
When comments are made which facially question a 
prospective juror's impartiality or prejudice, an 
abuse of discretion may occur unless the challenged 
juror is removed by the court or unless the court or 
counsel investigates and finds the inference rebutted. 
State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah 1989); State v. Bishop, 735 
P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988). 
In State v. Bailey, the Court pointed out that despite 
comments from a juror which "facially raised a question of bias, the 
Court failed to further probe [the] matter." 605 P.2d at 768. The 
Court noted that the trial court had removed another juror for cause 
who had made statements which were similar to those of the 
challenged juror. The Court held that under such circumstances, 
"the District Court had a duty to remove [the jurors] for bias, or 
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investigate further until the inference of bias was 
rebutted . . . ." Id. 
Hence, when a juror7s comments "facially raise[] a question 
of bias," the court abuses its discretion if it fails to probe 
further into the matter. Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768. 
Where an inference of bias is raised, it cannot be rebutted 
simply by the juror's statement that he or she can be fair. As the 
Court stated in State v. Jones, 734 P.2d at 475, citing Brooks II, 
631 P.2d at 884: "When a prospective juror expresses an attitude of 
bias, a later assertion by the juror that he or she can render an 
impartial verdict cannot attenuate the earlier expressions of 
bias." Furthermore, "[a] statement made by a prospective juror that 
he intends to be fair and impartial loses its meaning in light of 
other testimony or facts that suggest bias." State v. Hewitt, 689 
P.2d 22, 26 (Utah 1984). See also State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280 
(Utah 1985) (juror may not be able to recognize influence of 
improper contacts); People v. Diaz, 200 Cal. Reptr. 77, 80 (Cal. 
App. 4 Dist. 1984) (recognition that statement regarding ability to 
deliberate impartially is self-serving). 
In determining whether a trial judge erred in failing to 
excuse a juror for cause, "some deference must be accorded the 
discretion of the trial court." Jenkins, 627 P.2d at 536 (citations 
omitted). The Jenkins Court pointed out, however, that 
[nevertheless, we also view the exercise of 
discretion in light of the fact that it is a simple 
matter to obviate any problem of bias simply by 
excusing the prospective juror and selecting another. 
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Id. 
In order to properly exercise its discretion, the "trial 
court must determine by a process of logic and reason, based upon 
common experience, whether the juror can stand in attitude of 
indifference between the state and the accused. [citation 
omitted]" State v. Moton. 749 P.2d 639, 643 (Utah 1988). 
In Brooks II, the Utah Supreme Court held that reversible 
error occurred where the trial judge failed to excuse for cause two 
jurors who had been victims of a crime similar to that with which 
the defendant was charged. Both jurors indicated that they had 
strong feelings about their experiences but felt that they could 
render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence. 631 P.2d 
at 882-3. 
In Bailey, the trial court failed to excuse two jurors who 
indicated that they believed police officers are generally reliable 
observers or that the juror would rely on officers "a hundred 
percent." Th€> Supreme Court held that an inference of bias was 
raised in both cases and that the trial court committed prejudicial 
error in failing to remove the jurors where the inference was not 
rebutted. See also Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d at 535-6 (juror who 
would give greater credit to testimony of doctor should have been 
excused for cause even though juror indicated she would accept other 
evidence even if it was not in accord with that of doctor); 
Brooks I, 563 P.2d at 801 (prejudicial error not to excuse jurors 
for cause where jurors were friends with witnesses even though 
jurors indicated that they would not let friendship interfere). 
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In the present case, the trial judge asked whether any 
jurors had "been the victim of a forgery or a crime involving 
deception or fraud" (TI 32). Three jurors raised their hands. The 
trial judge then stated, "Mr. Hoyt, you yourself have been the 
victim of such a circumstance?" (TI 32). Juror Hoyt responded, 
"Yes, sir. My wallet was taken when I was in California and my 
credit card was used" (TI 33). 
The trial court asked Juror Hoyt no further questions and 
simply responded, "Very well, and Mr. VanLeeuwen?" Juror 
VanLeeuwen, the juror at issue in this case, stated, "I was in 
Brazil at the time that they stole checks and wrote about five grand 
on my account" (TI 33). Again, the trial judge directed no more 
individual questions to Juror VanLeeuwen, instead moving on to Juror 
Tyler, who stated that he "was robbed of some checks and a guy 
forged some checks on my[sic] when I lived in L.A. in ,61" (TI 33). 
The court directed one additional inquiry to all three 
jurors: 
Those three of you who have responded, 
recognizing that this is a different time and place 
and circumstance, would that experience, having been 
the victim of that type of a crime, affect your 
ability to be fair and impartial in this case, that 
is, would you be unable to set aside that experience 
and hear the evidence in this case and rule on the 
evidence based upon what you hear and the credibility 
of the witnesses? If you would not be able to do so, 
I want you to raise your hand. 
(TI 33). None of the jurors raised his hand (TI 33). 
At the conclusion of voir dire, the trial judge asked 
defense counsel whether he passed the jury for cause; defense 
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counsel responded that he did not (TI 35). The parties approached 
the bench, and defense counsel challenged Jurors Hoyt, VanLeeuwen 
and Tyler (TI 35, 74-5). 
The trial judge initially struck all three jurors for cause, 
then reinstated Juror VanLeeuwen (R 46; TI 74-5). The court's 
stated rationale for leaving Mr. VanLeeuwen on the panel was that 
Mr. VanLeeuwen7s experience had occurred in a foreign country and 
therefore would not affect his impartiality (TI 75). 
Mr. VanLeeuwen's statement that he had been a victim of a 
crime identical to the crime charged in the instant case and further 
information that a significant amount of money had been involved in 
his case, raised an inference of bias. Like the jurors in 
Brooks II, Juror VanLeeuwen was a victim of a similar crime. See 
generally People v. Diaz, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 79-85 (discussing strong 
potential for bias where juror had previously been the victim of a 
crime similar to the crime with which defendant was charged). 
Although the trial judge did not give Juror VanLeeuwen the 
opportunity to state his reaction to the crime or the depth of his 
feelings, the similarity of the crime along with the sum of money 
involved facially raised a question as to the juror's bias. The 
trial judge had an obligation to either excuse the juror for cause 
or investigate further. See Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768. The inference 
is not rebutted by Juror VanLeeuwen's failure to raise his hand in 
response to the judge's longwinded and somewhat confusing question 
to the group as a whole as to whether they could be impartial. See 
Jones, 734 P.2d at 475. The trial court's question failed to probe 
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further into the potential bias of the three jurors, and a 
self-serving response does not overcome the question of bias raised 
by the similarities. See Diaz, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 80. 
The trial court excused for cause the two other jurors who 
indicated that they had been victims of similar crimes. Neither of 
those jurors raised his hand in response to the trial judge's 
rehabilitative question. In other words, neither juror indicated 
that his experience as a victim would interfere with his ability to 
be impartial. The trial judge had no additional information about 
the other two jurors or their reactions to the crimes which would 
indicate bias; the judge was simply aware that the jurors had been 
the victims of a similar crime. Nevertheless, the trial judge 
excused both for cause (R 46). 
In State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987) n.l, the 
Court pointed out: 
We note that the trial court excused two other 
prospective jurors for cause because of their 
statements that they would expect the defendant to 
prove his innocence. Neither of these other jurors 
indicated that he had any direct ties to the murder 
victim or the victim's family, only that the juror 
held a generalized belief that a defendant should 
have to prove his innocence. This makes the trial 
court's failure to dismiss Ms. Opheikens for cause 
even more anomalous in light of her similar statement 
and her direct ties to the victim's family. 
See also State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768 (court failed to remove 
juror for cause who had agreed with comments of another juror who 
court did remove for cause; under such circumstances, the trial 
court "had a duty to remove [the juror] for bias, or investigate 
further until the inference of bias was rebutted . . . ,f) . 
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The trial judge attempted to distinguish any possible bias 
on the part of Juror VanLeeuwen from the bias of the other two 
jurors on the* basis that Mr. VanLeeuwen was the victim of a crime in 
a foreign country (TI 76) . Such "distinction" was meaningless for 
two reasons. First, it is not clear from Mr. VanLeeuwen7s statement 
that the crime occurred in a foreign country; the juror stated that 
he was in Brazil when his checks were stolen. A reasonable 
interpretation of the juror7s statement is that he was in Brazil but 
the stolen checks and checking account were in Utah.3 At the very 
least, if the trial court intended to rely on the foreign aspect of 
the crime, it was obligated to inquire further and clarify the 
ambiguities in the juror's statement. 
In addition, there is no logical basis for assuming that a 
victim of an identical crime in a foreign country will be less 
biased. In actuality, based on the meager information gathered by 
the trial court, Juror VanLeeuwen was the most likely of the three 
jurors to be biased. Juror Hoyt was the victim of theft and use of 
his credit card, not checks. The inconvenience to Mr. Hoyt and the 
difficulty in controlling unauthorized use may well have been easier 
in Mr. Hoyt's case than in that of Mr. VanLeeuwen.4 Although 
3
 If a checkbook were stolen in Brazil, it seems unlikely 
that anyone in Brazil would cash checks on a Utah bank. It also 
seems unlikely that the juror would have an account in Brazil. The 
most reasonable interpretation of Juror VanLeeuwen's statement was 
that while he was on a trip to Brazil, someone stole his checks in 
Utah and wrote five thousand dollars worth of checks on the account. 
4
 If Mr. VanLeeuwen were in fact vacationing in Brazil and 
returned to an overdrawn checking account where numerous checks had 
[continued] 
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Juror Tyler was a victim of an identical crime, that experience 
occurred in 1961, almost thirty years ago. The remoteness of the 
incident suggests less possibility of bias. Although an inference 
of bias was raised in all three cases, of the three jurors, Juror 
VanLeeuwen logically should have been the trial judge's first choice 
as a person to excuse for cause. 
It is important to note that the trial judge initially 
excused all three jurors for cause (R 46).5 After crossing out 
Juror VanLeeuwen on the jury list as the second juror excused for 
cause, the trial judge reinstated him (R 46). Defense counsel was 
forced to use a peremptory challenge to remove the juror (R 46). 
The jury panel consisted of eighteen people in this case 
(R 46). Pursuant to Rule 18(c)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, each party in this case had four peremptory challenges; 
the statute requires eight jurors for a noncapital felony trial. 
Had the judge removed all three of the jurors challenged for cause, 
the State would have had to agree to waive a peremptory challenge or 
the court would have had to expend additional efforts to locate and 
voir dire at least one additional juror. Such inconvenience is not 
a valid ground for denying a challenge for cause. 
4
 [continued] 
to be sorted out, Mr. VanLeeuwen probably experienced more of a 
headache as the result of being a victim of a similar crime than did 
Mr. Hoyt, who had a single credit card to deal with. 
5
 The juror list indicates that Juror Tyler was the #1 
juror excused for cause, Juror VanLeeuwen was the #2 juror excused 
for cause, and the Juror Hoyt was the #3 juror excused for cause. 
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In this case, the trial judge conducted a very limited 
voir dire of the panel. He refused to ask a number of questions 
propounded by defense counsel (R 99-103; TI 29, 30) and, when faced 
with answers from three jurors which raised a question of bias, 
failed to probe further, instead trying to quickly rehabilitate the 
jurors. Nevertheless, he removed two of the jurors but left a third 
who was distinguishable only by the fact that he was the most likely 
of the three to be biased. 
The trial judge committed reversible error in failing to 
remove Juror VanLeeuwen for cause. As a result, Mr. Woolley is 
entitled to a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, PAUL EDWIN WOOLLEY, by and through counsel, 
CHARLES F. LOYD, JR. and JOAN C WATT, respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse his conviction and remand his case for a new 
trial. 
SUBMITTED this JliJL day of May, 1990. 
CHARLES FyJ&7&,/J 
Attorney /for Dejren&rfnt/Appellant 
C^JJkLiLuSty 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 18(e)(4), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection 
to a particular juror and may be taken on one or 
more of the following grounds: 
(14) that a state of mind exists on 
the part of the juror with reference to the 
cause, or to either party, which will prevent 
him from acting impartially and without 
prejudice to the substantial rights of the 
party challenging; but no person shall be 
disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the 
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, 
founded upon public rumor, statements in 
public journals or common notoriety, if it 
satisfactorily appears to the court that the 
juror can and will, notwithstanding such 
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the 
matter to be submitted to him. 
Amendment VI to the United States Constitution provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife 
shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall 




THE COURT: I will instruct you, members of the 
jury panel, at a later point in this trial that you are to 
give no more or less credibility to the testimony of a law 
enforcement official than you would to any other witness* 
The fact that they are employed as a law enforcement officer 
does not give more or less credibility to their testimony. 
Now, having stated that, are there any among you who are so 
persuaded that law enforcement officers are more credible or 
less credible than other witnesses that you couldn't be fair 
and impartial in judging their testimony? If so, raise your 
hand. 
No hands are raised. 
MR. LOYD: Thank you, your Honor. Could you 
inquire if any of them — I believe you asked them if any of 
the jurors had been accused of a forgery type crime. Could 
you ask if any of their close friends or relatives have ever 
been the victim of forgery, theft, or any crime involving 
fraud or pecuniary loss? 
THE COURT: Are there those among you first, 
members of the panel, who have yourselves been the victim of 
a forgery or a crime involving deception or fraud? If so, I 
want you to raise your hand. 
Mr. Hoyt, you yourself have been the victim of 
such a circumstance? 
32 
1 MR. HOYT: Yes, sir. My wallet was taken when I 
2 was in California and my credit card was used. 
3 THE COURT: Very well, and Mr. VanLeeuwen? 
4 MR. VANLEEUWEN: I was in Brazil at the time that 
5 they stole checks and wrote about five grand on my account. 
6 THE COURT: Very well. No other hands are raised, 
7 Counsel. 
8 Those of you, Messrs. Hoyt and VanLeeuwen, who 
9 have responded to that question — oh, excuse me. 
10 Mr. Tyler? 
11 MR. TYLER: Yes, I was robbed of some checks and a 
12 guy forged some checks on my when I lived in L.A. in '61. 
13 THE COURT: Very well. Thank you, Mr. Tyler. No 
14 other hands are raised. 
15 J Those three of you who have responded, recognizing 
that this is a different time and place and circumstance, 16 
17
 I would that experience, having been the victim of that type 
18 I of a crime, affect your ability to be fair and impartial in 
*
9
 this case, that is, would you be unable to set aside that 
20
 I experience and hear the evidence in this case and rule on 
21
 I the evidence based upon what you hear and the credibility of 
the witnesses? If you would not be able to do so, I want 
you to raise your hand. 
No hands are raised, Mr. Loyd. 






THE COURT: Excuse me, Ms. West? 
MS. WEST: Getting back to the second half of that 
question that I believe you were going to answer, I have a 
family member who has been convicted of a felony for 
forgery. 
THE COURT: Very well. Is this a close family 
member, ma'am? 
MS. WEST: Sister. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Ms. West. 
Insofar as this Court is concerned, Ms. West, 
would that experience affect your ability in this case to be 
fair and impartial? 
MS. WEST: No. 
THE COURT: Do you believe you could set aside 
that circumstance? 
MS. WEST: Yes. 
THE COURT: Very well. Thank you. 
MR. LOYD: Your Honor, my last question, I think 
you asked this in general, but whether or not any of the 
jurors have such pressing personal business that they would 
not be able to focus their attention on this case during the 
trial and deliberations. 
THE COURT: I did ask that question, Counsel. 
Recognizing, of course, that the jurors are taken out of 
their daily lives to be here, and by observation is that 
34 
they've all responded they would perform their duties in 
this case unfettered by those concerns. 
You pass the jury for cause, Mr. Loyd? 
MR. LOYD: No, I don't, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Counsel approach the bench. 
(Whereupon, discussion was held at the bench out 
of the hearing of the Reporter.) 
THE COURT: All right, Counsel, based upon our 
discussions at the bench, you may now take your peremptory 
challenges. 
Members of the jury panel, we're now at the point 
in this trial when the parties and their counsel have the 
opportunity to determine which of you will be serving on the 
jury in this case. You have observed up to this point in 
time that I've asked you certain questions that bear upon 
your qualifications to serve as jurors and have made deter-
minations as to which of you is qualified. Through the 
process now called peremptory challenge, each party has the 
opportunity to directly determine which of you will be 
serving as jurors. Since this is a criminal case, each 
party will have four peremptory challenges and may exercise 
those challenges for any reason whatsoever, whether that be 
great or slight. It is important for you to understand, 
however, that in the event you are not chosen as a juror 
here/ you should not take the matter personally for the 
35 
